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This chapter is divided in three sections: I) evidence, where we summarize what emerges from a legal and comparative analysis of the national chapters included in this volume; II) analysis, in which we discuss the extent to which the current national regulatory standards are consistent with the five foundational principles we identified; and, III) recommendations, where we offer our vision of an international governance framework that promotes science and technological development while being mindful and respectful of international human rights standards as well as the different sensitivities with which citizens from different parts of the world approach this complex problem.
As the readers will notice, our analysis focuses mainly on the first two principles: freedom of research and benefit sharing. This is because the evidence gathered in the first section points to dignity, and the obligation to respect and to protect the rights and individual freedoms of othersin the recommendations section. Of course, we hasten to say that the views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors who contributed the national chapters to this book.
I) EVIDENCE

1) Basic Research
In this study, we defined 'basic research' as in vitro or ex vivo studies of germline tissue of humans, animals or of the two in combination, done to understand the biological mechanisms of germline genome modification. Basic research on germline genome modification can be done using either gametes (sperm and oocytes) or embryos.
a) Basic research using gametes
Among the countries we studied, the regulation of research using gametes is relatively underdeveloped. Very few have rules that apply specifically to the use of sperm and oocyte in basic research. In this regard, the Swiss Federal Constitution is an exception. It prohibits any "interference with the genetic material of human reproductive cells", including gametes. That being said, the regulatory framework of most countries neither prohibits nor permits germline genome modifications expressly, creating uncertainties for researchers that we will discuss later in this chapter. In some cases, while silent as to whether researchers can modify gametes and embryos, the regulatory frameworks prohibit using modified gametes and embryos to achieve reproduction. If one follows the general legal principle by which everything-which-isnot-forbidden-is-allowed, the conclusion can be drawn that since the regulators excluded some goals of germline engineering, particularly clinical research and applications, they did not exclude other goals of germline engineering, particularly acquiring knowledge and basic research. This is the conclusion that was reached by the authors of chapters on the six countries that allow the creation of research embryos (Belgium, Israel, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and several jurisdictions in the United States).
Overall, the picture that emerges from our comparative analysis of the regulation of basic research with embryos and gametes is that this is an area filled with prohibitions and restrictions.
In the second part of this chapter, we will discuss whether these regulations are excessively restrictive given that states must ensure the freedom indispensable for scientific research and the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. However, before we move to that analysis, we need to address two more issues: the regulation of clinical research and applications. not been tested in courts, so the extent to which clinical applications are actually permitted is unclear, but the possibility is intriguing.
Similarly, France permits the study of germline engineering techniques whose primary aim is therapeutic (e.g. preventing a genetic disease) rather than altering the descendants of the treated embryo. "If that is correct," Blasimme, Caminiti, and Vayena conclude, "the use of genome editing technologies on human embryos that will likely result in germline modifications may not be a 
3) Clinical Research
The regulation of clinical research is less clear-cut and, although in the traslational pipeline it comes before clinical application, we present it after the discussion on clinical applications because, in some countries, the ban on clinical research is the corollary of a ban on clinical 13 more restrictive reading of the statute: the prohibition of clinical applications "could also apply in the research context," Nicol argues, "where the intention for the genetic manipulation to be passed on to future generations is absent, but the intention to modify the genome in a way that could be inherited is present". 43 In South Korea, since the law prohibits clinical research with a therapeutic goal, one could surprisingly argue that clinical research without a-therapeutic goal (e.g. enhancement or aesthetic reasons) is allowed. 44 In Japan, although clinical research using germline genome editing is largely prohibited, editing that does not involve "the administration of a gene or cells" is not prohibited. Acutely, Ishii points out that this could be done if editing is performed using a messenger RNA (mRNA) rather than by inserting a plasmid harboring a gene of template 59 However, it is worth reiterating here the key rights that inform our analysis: the 'right to science', also known as the right of everyone to benefit from scientific progress (benefit sharing), and the 'rights of science', of which the right to engage in scientific research (scientific freedom)
is an essential component.
Both international human rights law and international bioethics law agree that freedom of research must be respected. Respecting freedom of research requires states to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with it, 60 and avoiding taking measures that hinder or prevent the enjoyment of this right. 61 Simply put: scientists must be allowed to engage in scientific inquiries freely. However, the 'right to science' and the 'rights of science' are not absolute rights. They can be limited. Restrictions on the enjoyment of these rights are allowed only if they are consistent with international human rights standards. Specifically, they require that three conditions are met:
(1) any restriction must be prescribed by law (condition of legality); (2) any restriction must pursue a legitimate aim (condition of legitimacy); and (3) any restriction must be limited to what is necessary to fulfill that aim, and be the result of a careful balancing of interests (condition of proportionality Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435815
In the following subsections, we will discuss and critically examine the most important limits imposed on the effective enjoyment of the human rights to science in the area of human germline engineering. We will pay special attention to the question whether these limits are consistent with international human standards and states' obligations related to these rights.
1) Restrictions must be prescribed by law (condition of legality)
According to article 4 of the ICESCR, limitations to scientific freedom must be The principle of legal certainty is a "general principle of law common to civilized nations", 66 that is to say a legal principle that can be found in 68 In the Common Law tradition, legal certainty is often explained in terms of citizens' ability to organize their affairs in such a way that does not break the law. In the United States, the principle of legal certainty is understood as 'fair warning' and the 'void for vagueness'. 69 In both legal traditions, legal certainty is regarded as grounding value for the legality of legislative and administrative measures taken by public authorities. 70 The principle is also given importance in the context of the UN work on the promotion of the rule of law at the national and international levels. Here the rule of law requires legal certainty, and both are an essential condition for the full realization of human rights. 71 Invariably given the disparity of treatment between embryos created in the national territory and those coming from abroad.
3) Restrictions must be limited to what is necessary to fulfill legitimate aims, and be the result of a careful balancing of interests (condition of proportionality)
Restrictions must not only be the result of reasonably clear laws adopted democratically Korea, Spain, and Switzerland). One, Australia, has restrictions so extensive that amount to a de facto prohibition. 92 We believe allowing scientists to create research embryos is necessary for them to be able to enjoy their freedom of research. As deWert and colleagues noted, "only in countries where the creation of embryos for the exclusive purpose of research is allowed could [gene editing] be applied at earlier stages and with fresh oocytes and embryos." 93 Research on supernumerary IVF embryos is only a second best, because of the limited number of embryos available and because a considerable percentage of those have not been implanted because they are either not viable or affected by various disorders. Modifying the genome of embryos is better than modifying the genome of gametes as the chances of off -target mutations and mosaicism are reduced. 94 We are not advocating unlimited freedom to create any embryos for research. The six jurisdictions that permit the creation of research embryos show that it is possible to strike a balance between the needs of science and ethical concerns. There, the creation of research embryos is limited by various rules, including the requirement to obtain consent from tissue donors, approval and oversight, and the '14-day' rule. We believe these limitations are compatible with human rights standards as their rationale is to protect other human rights (the rights of the research subjects) and are enacted democratically. Ethical approvals and oversight ensure that the research 30 science. 120 The 14-day rule is a "legal and regulatory line in the sand that has for decades limited in vitro human-embryo research to the period before the 'primitive streak' appears." 121 That being said, the 14-day rule "was never intended to be a bright line denoting the onset of moral status in human embryos." 122 Instead it has been a "theoretical [line respected] until now because scientists have been technologically incapable of moving past the 14-day threshold." 123 However, recent developments have raised the question of further extending the possibility of researching on embryos beyond 14 days. Until 2016, culturing human embryos in-vitro had never gone beyond nine-days. 124 In 2016, human embryos were sustained in-vitro for 12-13 days. 125
Obsolesce of regulatory frameworks is certainly not a new problem in science and technology law and policy, or a problem only of science and technology law and policy. As often happens with disruptive scientific and technological breakthroughs, lawmakers are struggling to adjust the regulatory frameworks with these developments. Elen Stokes refers to this problem as one of 'inherited rules.' "New technologies", she points out, "do not always elicit new regulatory responses. More often than not, policymakers deal with new technologies by deferring to existing regulatory regimes". 126 However, the fact that this problem occurs "more often than not" does not make it acceptable. Indeed, it directs attention to the fact that the Sisyphean task of meeting human rights obligations is a never-ending enterprise that requires legislative bodies to be well-informed about new developments with a view to revise and update laws accordingly.
CRISPR is a significant scientific and technological advancement that has accelerated the timeline of clinical applications based on germline engineering becoming available to patients. It is a game changer, one that puts in question how governments have regulated human genome germline modifications in the past, and that calls "for a broad public dialogue about these technologies and their applications". 127 Obsolete legislation may not reflect how the public values the benefits and risks of heritable genome editing. Governments must engage legislatures, ministerial bodies, national science councils and other venues for public engagement to ensure that regulatory frameworks adopted years before the advent of CRISPR are adjusted to how to best promote the welfare in a democratic society considering the opportunities offered by new technology and scientific progress here and now, not a decade ago. 128 
III) RECOMMENDATIONS
To conclude, as a recommendation, we would like to sketch what we believe a regulatory framework for human genome germline modifications that is informed by international human rights law and, more specifically, the right to science and the rights of science should look like.
To begin, we believe the primary responsibility for regulating heritable gene editing falls on (legitimately elected) governments rather than international organizations or civil society bodies. International law creates obligations that national governments must discharge to ensure progressively the full realization of human rights in the area of scientific and technological progress, not least the human right to science. International organizations or civil society bodies can play an important governance role in supporting the implementation of these obligations.
However, they cannot substitute the role national governments are expected to play.
As with the rest of the rights recognized in the Covenant, the right to science and the rights of science imply different sets and levels of obligations. The key obligations governments have in this regard are to "respect, protect, and fulfill" everyone's rights to contribute scientific progress (scientific freedom) and to enjoy such progress (benefit sharing). 129 As discussed in the previous 32 section, the 'obligation to respect' requires that governments do not interfere in the enjoyment of the right to science unless they have a legitimate reason for doing so, one that is based on science and actual risks, as opposed to political opportunity and speculation. However, just as important to our analysis is the 'obligation to fulfill'. This obligation translates into the creation of a legal framework and a regulatory environment that is conducive to the effective enjoyment of the right to science, both scientific freedom and benefit sharing. 130 The same obligation requires states to "adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures" towards the full realization of the rights to science. 131 At a minimum, governments are expected to adopt legislative measures that allow a person to exercise or enjoy scientific freedom and benefit sharing effectively. As we discussed in the previous section, this requires, inter alia, that the legal framework is sufficiently certain and up-to-date. 132 
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We recognize that this is a controversial area of science and that not all societies are willing, at least for now, to move forward with heritable gene editing, even if the goal is strictly therapeutic.
Human rights law accommodates this diversity of viewpoints by establishing that the human right to science, which incorporates scientific freedom and benefit sharing, is not absolute. As it has already been mentioned several times before, according to Article 4 of the Covenant, rights can be restricted by law for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.
Governments may, and in certain cases must, restrict scientific freedom and benefit. They can certainly ban applications of gene editing techniques to enhance humans or for cosmetic reasons, if they democratically and lawfully decide to do so.
We believe blank prohibitions, such as those banning all research on human embryos and all clinical research, to be in violation of international law. Limitations based on safety health considerations are easier to defend since preclinical research has so far failed to show that germline engineering is sufficiently safe to be experimented on humans, due to the risk of off-target mutations and mosaicism. However, states must discharge the burden of proving an actual risk to health and safety and explain how and why the health of the many trumps the right of those who are sick to be cured. In addition, the only lawful prohibitions are those determined by law, and law must be sufficiently clear. Given the transformative nature of CRISPR, prohibitions that date back a decade or two, cannot be considered to have been truly democratically accepted. These issues need to be debated again and, only if a broad agreement is reached in favor of prohibiting this kind of research applied to humans, as it happened in the case of the 14-day rule, limitations will be acceptable.
We want to stress that we do not argue against the need for restrictions on freedom of research and benefit sharing, when necessary to ensure respect for the fundamental values of the community. Such restrictions might allow national governments to accommodate considerations of ethical or religious diversity, and give some margin for societies to choose the appropriate speed at which they wish to participate in innovation. The international human rights framework allows countries to choose, in consideration of their available resources, as long as they use their resources to the maximum, to be at the forefront of innovation to develop a regulatory framework favorable for making advances in the area of gene editing. This is another reason to entrust national, rather than international, lawmakers to find the right balance between the right to science and the rights of science and their limitations. The goal is to promote science and technological development while being mindful and respectful of international human rights standards as well as the different sensitivities with which citizens from different parts of the world approach this complex problem.
That being said, national policies must fulfil article 2 of the Covenant, which requires the progressive realization of the rights.
They must also be in accordance with Article 15.3, which requires governments to encourage and develop "international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields". International cooperation is particularly important in germline genome engineering. The scientific and technical complexities of this field demand scientific efforts that transcend national boundaries and often involve scientists from multiple countries. These efforts may take the form of collaborations among researchers across borders, pooling and sharing resources and expertise, and validation of results with scientists traveling to other countries to attend meetings, to visit labs, to lecture, or to access resources and expertise. National policies must enable international cooperation, especially since only a few countries have chosen to be at the forefront of innovation in this field. When clinical applications become reality, international cooperation will foster exchanges that ensure the sharing of benefits to patients of countries that have chosen a more conservative approach. International bodies have a role to play as facilitators of regulatory harmonization, custodians of knowledge of best practices and current regulations, and as promoters of a global conversation on how innovation can be balanced against other considerations.
The framework we propose must also ensure that other human rights are protected. The rights of research participants are particularly important in this area. Any research must be carried out in accordance with international standards of research involving human subjects, of which the right to free and informed consent is the first. In addition, research preapproval and oversight, which are commonplace in biomedical research, are necessary to ensure a responsible exercise of scientific freedom. To the extent possible, legal frameworks must be narrowly tailored, and be
